We examine the intra-industry credit contagion effect when firms emerge from and refile for Chapter11 bankruptcies. We use the industry competitors" daily credit default swap (CDS) spreads to measure the contagion effects. We find that the firm"s emergence from bankruptcy protection favorably affects the creditworthiness of market leaders. One possible interpretation of the result is that industry leaders could be less susceptible to the competitive challenges induced by the reinvigorated firms from bankruptcies. In addition, the markets may interpret such events positively since healthy competitors can boost and benefit the prospects of industry. Further, we find that Chapter 11 bankruptcy refilings also generate a favorable contagion effect. Apparently, the refiling firm"s industry peers may benefit from the financial difficulty of the refiling firms.
Introduction
Jorion and Zhang (2007) explain the intraindustry information transfer effects of Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings in terms of the credit contagion effects. They argue that Chapter 11 bankruptcy filers are very likely to reemerge from the bankruptcy process as competitive industry rivals. Therefore, such credit events may unfavorably affect the creditworthiness of the bankrupt firm's industry peers. Alternatively, Chapter 7 filings cause the liquidation of distressed firms and therefore industry competitors may gain additional market share from the displaced firms, leading to a favorable effect on the credit ratings of peer firms.
The purpose of the study is twofold. First, we extend Jorion and Zhang (2007) by examining the effect on creditworthiness of their industry peers when the bankrupt companies emerge from the Chapter 11 process. 19 Second, we further examine the credit contagion effect on its industry competitors when a bankrupt firm files for bankruptcy protection a second time. To better understand the effects of the two credit events is of importance for the proper specification of default correlation in portfolio credit risk models. Since portfolio credit risk modeling techniques have been widely used by investment management and financial institutions, our findings may provide meaningful insights into the construction of portfolios with credit-sensitive financial instruments. 19 Prior studies suggest that about 80% of firms filing bankruptcies subsequently emerge from the Chapter 11 process (Wruck 1990; Gilson et al. 1990; Weiss 1990 ). In our dataset, about 60% of sample firms reorganize and emerge from Chapter 11 bankruptcies. See Section 3 for details.
A company's emergence from Chapter 11 may have an unfavorable credit contagion effect on its peers, because such credit events imply fiercer intra-industry competition caused by the reintroduction of a financially healthy rival into the market (Eberhart et al. 1999 ; Jorion and Zhang 2007). On the other hand, the very event could also signal revivified future prospects for the industry (Caton et al. 2008 ) and thereby favorably affect the creditworthiness of industry competitors. 20 Since the two countervailing effects could cooccur, the observed effect is the net result of the two. To better capture the two competing effects, we partition the sample set into two groups, market leaders and followers, based on their credit ratings.
The industry's leading firms in general have a substantial competitive advantage, which is closely linked to the development of a firm's intangible resources (Guimon 2005) and is thus deemed the most valued intangible driver (Hall 2003; Lev 2002) . Since intangibles are one of the main sources of future cash flows, they are essential in evaluating the firm's capacity to meet future debt obligations (Guimon 2005). As such, market leaders are mostly characterized by their higher credit ratings. We speculate that industry leaders can be less vulnerable to the competition challenge induced by companies emerging from bankruptcy protection. Indeed, the market may interpret such credit events as good news since healthy competitors can benefit and boost the future prospects of the industry (Helms and Wright 1997). Therefore, for intra-industry leaders we expect to observe a favorable contagion effect when firms emerge from Chapter 11.
Alternatively, market followers are generally young, growing firms, which are typically high yield bond issuers (Hakim and Shimko 1995). Therefore, industry followers are more likely to suffer from poor ratings. We speculate that firms emerging from a bankruptcy process may pose a real threat to the followers, because firms with poor credit ratings are likely to compete with each other for cheaper external funding. Accordingly, we expect such events would have an unfavorable contagion effect on the market followers in industries. 20 Caton et al. (2008, p.305 ) argue, -When entering Chapter 11 sickness is contagious, but when exiting from Chapter 11 health is contagious‖.
In the second part of the study, we examine the credit contagion effect on their industry rivals as firms file Chapter 11 bankruptcies a second time. 21 Prior studies (e.g., LoPucki and Whitford 1993; Hotchkiss 1995; Gilson 1997) found a large incidence of firms filing for bankruptcy or restructuring their debt a second time. Further, Altman et al. (2009) found significant economic differences between the firms emerging from Chapter 11 and surviving as going concerns and those later filing bankruptcy again. In particular, firms refiling Chapter 11 have significantly higher leverage and lower profitability than those emerging and continuing as going concerns. Since industry rivals are very likely to benefit from the financial difficulty of the bankruptcy refiler, we expect a favorable intra-industry contagion effect on their industry peers when firms file for bankruptcy a second time.
To address our research questions, we collect sample firms emerging from Chapter 11 and refiling for Chapter 11 bankruptcy from Lynn M. LoPucki Further, consistent with our conjecture, we find a dominant favorable effect for their peers when firms refile for bankruptcies. All observed event windows are significantly negative for market followers, but less so for market leaders. In addition, the size of the reduction in ACCSCs ranges from 2.04 to 9.19 basis points. One possible interpretation of the result is that market followers are more likely to gain market share from the Chapter 11 refilers due to their similar competitive position.
Our study provides interesting and meaningful contrasts to Jorion and Zhang (2007). First, they find an unfavorable effect on their industry peers when companies enter Chapter 11. Jorion and Zhang interpret their findings to be a result of heightened competition triggered by the bankrupt firms' emergence from Chapter 11. However, they did not actually look into those events and thus it is unclear how the events of reorganization and emergence from Chapter 11 affect the peer firm's credit ratings. In this study, we focus on the events of firms' emergence from Chapter 11 and find a favorable credit contagion effect on their market leaders when firms exit Chapter 11.
Second, Jorion and Zhang (2007) showed an unfavorable contagion effect on the industry competitors as firms file Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. However, it remains unanswered as to how the second Chapter 11 filings affect the creditworthiness of the industry peers. We find a favorable contagion effect when firms file for bankruptcy a second time, especially for the industry followers. One possible interpretation of the result is that the refiling firm's industry peers may benefit from the financial difficulty of the refiling firms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our methodology. Section 3 summarizes the data selection procedure and reports the descriptive statistics. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Methodology
To measure the credit effect, we first select all industry peers of bankrupt firms from COMPUSTAT to construct an industry portfolio, which is formed based on the 3-digit standard industry classification (SIC) code. Further, to measure the changes in the credit risk of industry competitors surrounding the credit events, we calculate the cumulative CDS spread changes for each industry peer over a day or a time interval [t i, t j ]. The cumulative CDS spread changes for each peer firm over a time interval [t i, t j ] is measured by subtracting the CDS spreads for day t i-1 from that for day t j , where t i and t j are the number of days relative to the event date and i  j. We then calculate the equally weighted cumulative CDS spread changes for each industry portfolio.
Further, we calculate the cross-sectional mean, i.e., the average cumulative CDS spread changes (ACCSCs), and standard deviations for all industry portfolios. Next, we compute tstatistics to test the significance of the contagion effects. Like other credit instruments, CDS spreads reflect the underlying firm's credit quality. Namely, larger (smaller) CDS spreads suggest that the underlying firm's credit quality decreases (increases).
If a favorable contagion effect dominates, we expect the ACCSCs around the event date to be significantly negative. By contrast, if an unfavorable contagion effect dominates, we expect the ACCSCs surrounding credit event date to be significantly positive.
Sample selection and descriptive statistics
We select bankrupt company data from the Lynn M. LoPucki Table I , Panel B summarizes the number of industry peers for the three credit events. At first, we find 1,331 peer firms for the first event, i.e., a firm's filing Chapter 11 bankruptcy, 954 industry peers for the second event, i.e., a firm's emergence from bankruptcies, and 147 peer firms for the third event, i.e., a firm's refiling bankruptcy. Some industry rivals' CDS spread data are not available, thus we delete 35, 40, and 21 industry peer firms for the three credit events, respectively. Lastly, the number of intra-industry competitors is 1,296 for Chapter 11 filing, 914 for emergence from Chapter 11, and 126 for refiling Chapter 11 events. 24 The Markit database assigns each firm a credit rating, i.e., AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC or D. By credit ratings, we divide the data into two categories, Investment Grade (IG) and High Yield (HY). We refer IG firms to those with higher ratings, including AAA, AA, A, and BBB. In addition, we define HY firms as those having lower ratings, including BB, B, CCC, and D. We find 67% of Chapter 11 filing firms' competitors have credit ratings lower than BBB. Alternatively, more than 50% of intra-industry rivals of the emerging and refiling firms have above-BBB ratings.
Further, Panel A of Table II summarizes the daily CDS spread data for industry peers 24 The emerging firms are distributed across 148 different industries. The industry portfolio for an event of emergence from Chapter 11, on average, contains three to four industry peers. Alternatively, the refiling firms cover 66 different industries and each industry portfolio, on average, contains one to two industry competitors. Next, we partition the dataset into two groups, i.e., HY and IG groups. As shown in Panel B and C of Table II, the daily CDS spreads and standard deviations of the HY group are, on average, greater than that of the IG group, indicating that peer firms in the IG group have higher credit ratings and less volatility than those in the HY group.
Panel A of Table III summarizes the distribution of CDS spread data over each credit rating. Compared with the IG group, the HY group has higher average CDS spreads and larger standard deviations, which reflect higher credit risk. Panel B of Table III shows that most CDS spread data for the IG group cluster in credit ratings from A to BBB. Alternatively, Panel C of Table III indicates that most firms in the HY group have credit ratings from BB to B.
Empirical results
We calculate the average cumulative CDS spread changes. i.e., ACCSCs, for several event windows around the event of filing Chapter 11 bankruptcy and report the results in Table IV Alternatively, for the industry leader (IG) group, the ACCSCs is significantly positive for windows [-5, 5] at the 10% level. We notice there are several negative ACCSCs for the IG group, but none are significant. Overall, the results are consistent with Jorion and Zhang (2007) that the announcements of filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcies in general have dominant unfavorable contagion effects on the bankrupt firm's industry peers, causing the peer firms' CDS spreads to increase surrounding the announcement of Chapter 11 bankruptcies.
Next, we calculate the ACCSCs for the events of emergence from Chapter 11 and report the results in Table V . We find several 25 The website is http://www.markit.com/information/home.html. The number of total observations of full dataset is 19,419,411 and covers 1,090 names.
negative ACCSCs for the full sample, but none are significant. The result seemingly indicates that the emergence announcement on average does not significantly affect the creditworthiness of the emerging firm's industry peers. However, the event of emergence from Chapter 11 may have different effects on the bankrupt firm's rivals with different competitive positions. To better capture the credit effects, we partition the full sample into market leaders (IG) and followers (HY) and then we calculate the ACCSCs for the two sub-sample groups. For the HY group, we find that the ACCSCs are still insignificant. By contrast, for the IG group, we find negative ACCSCs for 10 event windows. Especially, the ACCSCs for the 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11-day windows decrease significantly. The size of reduction in ACCSCs ranges from 2.53 to 4.90 basis points, which are significant at the 1% level. The result has two implications. First, it is consistent with our conjecture that splitting the data could help capture the credit effect. Second, the event of a firm's emergence from Chapter 11 could have a favorable contagion effect on the market leaders' credit ratings, probably because such credit events convey good news as to the prospects of the industry.
Finally, we calculate the ACCSCs for their industry peers as firms refile Chapter 11 and report the result in Table VI. Table VI shows that, for the full sample, the ACCSCs from oneday window, [-5, -5], to 11-day window, [-5, 5] , are all negative, indicating that the favorable contagion effect dominates, as expected. In particular, the ACCSCs for windows [-5, -3] , [-5, -2] and [-5, -1] are significantly negative at the 1% level. Moreover, for market followers (HY), the favorable effect is even clearer, as evident by the significantly negative ACCSCs for all event windows. On the other hand, except for [-5, -5], we find that the ACCSCs for other event windows are also negative for the market leaders. In addition, the ACCSCs for windows [-5, 1] , [-5, 3] , and [-5, 4 ] are significant at the 10% level. This result is consistent with our conjecture that the secondtime Chapter 11 filings in general favorably affect the creditworthiness of industry peers. We interpret the result as the industry rivals, including market leaders and followers, being able to benefit by gaining additional market share due to the difficulties of the refiling firms.
Conclusion
In this study, we examine the intra-industry credit contagion effects on industry rivals when firms emerge from Chapter 11 bankruptcy and file Chapter 11 a second time. An unfavorable contagion effect suggests an increase in CDS spreads of bankrupt firm's industry peers surrounding a credit event and, in contrast, a favorable contagion effect implies a decrease in CDS spreads surrounding a credit event.
Using the CDS spread database, we find that the first Chapter 11 filing has an unfavorable contagion effect, consistent with Jorion and Zhang (2007). Further, we find the emergence from Chapter 11 could have a favorable contagion effect on the creditworthiness of market leaders. One possible interpretation for the result is that market leaders could be less susceptible to the competitive challenge induced by firms emerging from bankruptcies. In addition, markets may interpret such events positively since healthy competitors can benefit and boost the prospects of the industry. Finally, we find Chapter 11 bankruptcy refilings have a favorable contagion effect. Apparently, the industry peers may benefit from the difficulty of the refiling firms. We collect data of firms filing bankruptcy from Lynn M. LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database. First, we collect 768 Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection filings. Next, we identify and collect 457 firms emerging from Chapter 11, for which we find a -yes‖ marked in the -XEmergeRefile‖ column. Moreover, we find 94 refiling firms by looking for a -Refiled‖ or -Refile‖ shown in the -Refile‖ column. Finally, as shown in Panel A, there are 209 firms filing for Chapter 11, 133 firms emerging from Chapter 11, and 33 firms refiling for Chapter 11, respectively. Panel B reports the number of intra-industry competitors for each of the three credit events. We partition the full sample into two groups, i.e., High Yield (HY), and Investment Grade (IG) groups. High Yield (HY) group contains industry peers with AvRating equal to or higher than BBB. Investment Grade (IG) group includes peer firms with AvRating lower than BBB. 
